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Executive Summary
This report on the concerns of Vietnam and Vietnam-Era veterans in Massachusetts
comes at a critical moment. When the inquiry was initiated in 1988, few people an-
ticipated the precipitous decline in the state and national economy, fewer could have
foreseen the rapid sequence of events leading to American entry into another war. As
the state fiscal crisis has eroded gains made by veterans over the last 20 years and
military service in the Gulf has changed the lives of a new generation of Americans, it
becomes all the more urgent to recognize the long-term, multi-generational conse-
quences of war and to affirm the need for a comprehensive program on behalf of
veterans. In 1992 Vietnam-Era veterans will become the majority veteran population
in this country, a major constituency supporting the need for such a comprehensive
program.
The William Joiner Center's follow-up investigation into the status of Vietnam and
Vietnam-Era Veterans indicates that, far from diminishing, the physical, psychologi-
cal, economic, and educational problems faced by Vietnam and Vietnam-Era veterans
are becoming more acute and that in many cases these problems extend to the lives of
their children. Among the key findings of this study are the following:
• Veterans who served in Vietnam are twice as likely as other veterans to have
children with birth defects.
• More than 15 years after the war's end, almost one-third of all Massachusetts'
veterans who served in combat or combat support units still suffer from some
form of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
• The rate ofunemployment among veterans is 2 percentage points higher than
the state average, and the number of homeless veterans and their families is
increasing.
• Rates of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and unemployment are significant-
ly higher among Massachusetts' veterans of color.
• As an increasing number of Massachusetts' Vietnam veterans seek to im-
prove their educational status, federal and state funding for veteran's educa-
tional programs and financial assistance is decreasing.
• Vietnam Veterans earn salaries on average 6% less than Vietnam-Era
veterans, are promoted less often, and are more apt to be underemployed or
employed in dead end jobs than Vietnam-Era veterans. Almost one quarter
of Vietnam veterans report not having received a promotion in over five
years.
• Vietnam and Vietnam-Era veterans overwhelmingly support increased
government spending on education, health care, AIDS research, and
programs for youth. Less than 42% favor increased spending for defense or
space programs.
Many of the findings which follow are alarming; they are cause for grave concern given
the fact that many of the programs introduced over the last ten years to address these
problems have been eliminated or severely cut.
Of particular significance are the following:
• The elimination of the state's Agent Orange Program, once a model for the
country.
• A 50% cut in state support for Outreach Centers which are the major source
of support for the state's combat veterans who suffer from PTSD.
• The elimination of the Brad Burns PTSD in-patient ward at Rutland Heights
State Hospital, serving veterans with severe PTSD.
• The lack of enforcement or awareness of state affirmative action mandates,
protecting Vietnam-Era veterans.
• The loss ofjob training programs such as the Federal Job Training Partner-
ship Act Title 4c Program.
In the pages that follow, these and other issues are analyzed in greater depth and a
program to meet the needs of veterans is presented.
Background
Vietnam and Vietnam-Era veterans in Massachusetts
There are over 8 million Vietnam-Era veterans in the United States (veterans who
served in the military between August 5, 1964 and May 7, 1975) and more than 2.5 mil-
lion veterans who actually served in Vietnam. During the war over 58,000 American
soldiers were killed in Vietnam, over 300,000 wounded and 2,500 reported missing in
action.
Currently there are more than 170,000 Vietnam-Era veterans who live in Mas-
sachusetts, approximately 60,000 ofwhom served in Vietnam. Casualties from the war
include 1,301 soldiers from Massachusetts killed in Vietnam and between 6,000 and
7,000 wounded. Fifty-five Massachusetts soldiers are listed as Missing in Action.
The Special Commission on the Concerns of Vietnam Veterans
In 1982, after hearings on numerous bills which called for the establishment of a body
to investigate the issues facing Vietnam veterans in Massachusetts, at the urging of
veterans' organizations across the state, and with support from the State Legislature,
the Massachusetts Special Commission on the Concerns of the Vietnam Veterans was
formed with Senator Francis D. Doris as its chair. The Commission was an appointed
body whose membership included: Senator Doris, Senate Chairman; Senator Joseph
Walsh; Representative Thomas J. Vallely, House Chairman; Representative Angelo
Scaccia; Dr. Robert Baughman; James Fitzpatrick; Walter Cotter; Allan Breen; Dr.
Richard Ryan; Dr. Louis Bartoshesky; James M. Connolly; Donald Jernigan; and David
Finkel.
The purpose of the Commission was to inform the Legislature on the status, needs, and
interests of the Vietnam and Vietnam-Era veterans residing in the Commonwealth.
To this end, the Commission held hearings in numerous Massachusetts cities and towns,
gathered data from local and national sources, and administered a state-wide survey
questionnaire. The final report of the 1983 survey was based on 16,636 responses to
the questionnaire. The Commission released the results of its investigation, the first
state-wide Vietnam Veterans Profile Study, in December 1983.
At the conclusion of its mission, the Commission requested that a follow-up study be
undertaken after five years in order to chart the status of the state's Vietnam-Era
veteran community over time and to measure the impact of its 1983 recommendations.
In summer 1988, the Joiner Center began the Follow-Up Survey, based on information
gathered from numerous federal, state, and local agencies, on discussions with re-
searchers and service providers, and on a questionnaire mailed to Vietnam-Era
veterans in Massachusetts.
The Follow-Up Survey
As with the initial survey, Vietnam-Era veterans in the Commonwealth were identified
through the "bonus list" (veterans whose service during the Vietnam War was credited
to Massachusetts received a bonus of $200 to $300, depending on whether they had
served in Vietnam or not) which was cross-checked against current addresses on file at
the Registry of Motor Vehicles. With the assistance of many Vietnam veteran service
providers who participated in discussions held at the Center and served as members of
a survey advisory committee, a new and more extensive questionnaire was developed,
containing one hundred twenty individual questions to be answered. A special phone
line with an "800" number was established to answer questions from veterans; it was
staffed for a one-month period following the mailing of the questionnaire.
More than 157,000 questionnaires were sent to Vietnam veterans across the Common-
wealth, making this veterans survey one of the largest and most comprehensive ever
conducted by any state organization. There were 17,844 respondents to this question-
naire, including 4,703 who had also responded to the 1983 survey. As with the 1983
survey, responses were almost equally divided between Vietnam and Vietnam-Era
veterans. In order to guarantee the validity of comparable responses, the 1988 survey
followed the multiple-choice format of the 1983 study. However, a number of new
questions were added, and space was provided at the end of the questionnaire for each
participant's comments. The size of the return in relation to the larger population re-
quires that general statements about the Commonwealth's Vietnam and Vietnam-Era
veterans be made with care. However, certain findings appear to mirror those of other
research projects, such as the National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study of July,
1988, and therefore must be taken as the most reliable indicators to date of the status
of the Commonwealth's Vietnam and Vietnam-Era veteran community.
What follows is a discussion of the 1988 survey findings, indicating the significant physi-
cal, psychological, economic, and educational factors and issues which now confront
the Commonwealth's Vietnam veterans and those who serve them. This data will be
presented on an issue-by-issue basis, and will include a review of the original recom-
mendations of the 1983 Commission and their implementation. Where appropriate
and necessary, other recent material relevant to each issue will be presented; finally,
new recommendations based on the present data will be made.
Agent Orange
Agent Orange is the most common term for several types of herbicides used by the U.S.
military during the Vietnam War. These herbicides contained various levels of dioxin,
a powerful carcinogenic and mutagenic chemical compound linked to skin disease, can-
cer, and birth defects. Vietnam veterans and their allies in the scientific community
maintain that exposure to Agent Orange has had debilitating health effects both for the
soldierswho were in sprayed areas and for their children, a position that various govern-
ment agencies and the chemical corporations insist cannot be verified. Recently,
federal legislation has attempted to address some of the issues of Agent Orange, but
still the battle lines between veterans and veterans advocates on the one side and the
federal government and chemical companies on the other continue to be drawn. This
situation has severely inhibited any institutional responses on behalf of dioxin victims
and their children.
The Commission Report
The Commission recommended that an accurate screening program be designed and
implemented throughout the Veterans Administration Medical Center (VAMC) sys-
tem and that the VA should start planning for increased cancer care capability. These
recommendations were not implemented. The Commission further recommended the
establishment of a state Agent Orange Program under the Office of the Commissioner
of Veterans Services.
The Commonwealth's Agent Orange Program
The Commission concluded that information about Massachusetts Vietnam veterans'
exposure to Agent Orange and the resulting health consequences warranted further re-
search and recommended that a state-wide Agent Orange Study be carried out by the
Massachusetts Commissioner of Veterans Services. A line item appropriation of
$350,000 created an Agent Orange program, operating out of the Office of the Com-
missioner of Veterans Services, with a mandate to conduct research, provide counsel-
ing services, and advocate for veterans who claimed they had been exposed to Agent
Orange. This was an important initiative, making Massachusetts a pacesetter. An ad-
visory committee for the Agent Orange program included Joseph Bangert, Dr. John
Constable, Dr. Matthew Meselson, Dr. Arnold Schechter, Christopher Gregory, Dr.
Ralph Timperi, Dr. Bruce Boynton, and Dr. Robert Baughman.
Three studies were conducted under the auspices of this program: 1. a mortality study
that showed the cancer rate among Vietnam combat veterans in Massachusetts was dis-
proportionately high. 2. A behavior study, conducted by McLean Hospital. 3. An
adipose tissue/blood plasma sample study done in conjuction with the University of
Umea, Sweden, that found elevated levels of dioxin in fat tissue even 20 years after ex-
posure.
The program provided outreach and information and referral services for veterans and
their families both in Massachusetts and nationally. In 1987, in cooperation with the
William Joiner Center, the Agent Orange Program co-hosted an international con-
ference on Agent Orange bringing together representatives from similar programs in
more than twenty-five states, and scientists from around the world (see below).
The Commonwealth's Agent Orange Program mandated to the Office of the Commis-
sioner of Veterans Services had a major impact nationally and was responsible for
several major initiatives in terms of policy making, legislation and new directions in
scientific research. However, in 1989, funding for the Agent Orange Program was
eliminated.
The 1987 Agent Orange Conference
Concern over the findings of the first Vietnam Veterans Profile Study led the Joiner
Center to convene an international conference on the Agent Orange issue in February,
1987. Leading scientists in the field of dioxin research from around the world met with
Vietnam veterans representing diverse communities in the United States, as well as
federal and state officials, to discuss current research and assess the medical, economic,
social, and political implications of the Agent Orange issue, concluding that Agent
Orange represented a major health issue and continuing legacy of the Vietnam War.
The proceedings of this conference were published in 1990 by the Joiner Center, Agent
Orange: Medical, Scientific, Legal, Political and Psychological Issues, Paul Atwood, ed.
(William Joiner Center, Boston, 1990).
The Agent Orange Court Settlement
A class-action suit on behalf ofVietnam veterans against chemical companies manufac-
turing Agent Orange was settled out of court in 1984 and the settlement was finalized
in 1988. In the case, veterans and their advocates argued that corporate records would
reveal prior knowledge of Agent Orange's toxicity within the chemical industry and lay
the foundation for a court ruling fixing damages and compensation to the victims. But
the chemical companies (Dow, etc.) successfully blocked disclosure by claiming
proprietary rights on the documents and by affirming that a competitive advantage
would be lost if "trade secrets" were made public. Without a full airing of evidence,
many veterans felt it was not possible for them to make the case necessary to secure
adequate compensation for injuries.
In the settlement, two funds were established. In the first, $180 million was set aside
to compensate veterans and their families who suffered from cancers relating to ex-
posure. The second, or "class assistance fund," set aside $50 million to support programs
that would benefit the class of Vietnam veterans as a whole. These funds are ad-
ministered directly by a court-appointed Special Master in New York.
The court's no-fault finding has meant veterans suffering from cancer and/or their next
of kin may be eligible for one-time individual payments of $5,000 to $12,000. Veterans
and their next of kin filing claims have expressed dissatisfaction with what they believe
is inadequate compensation for the damage done to them. The special fund for ser-
Medical Problems Related to AO Exposure
Vietnam Veteran Respondents
No Problems 1764 (34.6%) Have Problems 1433 (28.1%)
Not Sure 1906 (37.4%)
vices to the class of veterans and their children created by the court has emphasized
projects providing direct services in its funding priorities. Funds cannot be employed
to support further research. Several projects in Massachusetts have received funding
from the court.
The Follow-Up Survey
Responses to a number of questions concerning Agent Orange included in the survey
questionnaire point to the on-going difficulties that many Vietnam veterans see as
linked to the issue of exposure to chemical defoliants. Of all Vietnam veteran respon-
dents 28.1 % said they had medical problems related to Agent Orange, 37.4% said they
were unsure, while only 34.6% categorically stated they had no medical problems as-
sociated with exposure to Agent Orange.
These percentages increased among respondents who were sure they were in sprayed
areas. 3,191 (38.9%) among Vietnam veteran respondents reported being stationed in
sprayed areas. Of these, 1,226 (38.4%) cited medical problems which they felt could
be related to exposure to dioxin. A smaller number (771) indicated that they were cer-
tain they had come into direct contact with
Agent Orange (sprayed or handled); a
larger percentage of respondents in this
group (62.2%, or 495) said they felt they
had related medical problems. Of the
range of possible health difficulties now
associated with exposure to Agent
Orange, 69% cited skin conditions, while
6% had some form of cancer.
In addition to effects of dioxin exposure on
veterans themselves, the 1988 data con-
firmed the 1983 study in showing that the
children of veterans are also at risk. This
Exposure to the field and Children with Birth Defects
Among the Vietnam veterans 1424 (12.5%) of 1 1426 Children had birth defects
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Children of Vietnam Veterans
\y/ j Children of Era Veterans
possibility has been raised in a
number of studies, including
those conducted by the Nation-
al Center for Disease Control
(CDC), which have noted an
increased danger of particular
forms of birth defects (most
notably spina bifida and oral
clefts) that accompany high
levels of exposure. The 1988
survey indicates that 1,095
(19.7%) of the Vietnam
veterans with children had at
least one child with one or
more birth defects. Of the
11,426 children born to Viet-
nam veterans who responded to the survey, 1,424 (12.5%) had one or more birth
defects.
Comparing such figures with those of Vietnam-Era veterans, who did not serve in
country and are unlikely to have come into contact with Agent Orange, the survey shows
that 627 (10.9%) of those Vietnam-Era veterans with children had at least one child
with one or more birth defects. The families ofVietnam-Era veterans contained a total
of 12,530 children; 771 (6.15%) had one or more birth defects. These figures show that
a child born to a Vietnam veteran's family was twice as likely as a child born to a Viet-
nam-Era veteran's family of having some form of birth defect.
Conclusion
An argument can be made that, in a time of shrinking budget resources, as the biologi-
cal clock for Vietnam veterans continues to tick, that no new research projects should
be launched on the health consequences of exposure to Agent Orange. In fact, several
notable institutions involved in the matter have already reached that conclusion. In
1988, the CDC dropped in-progress studies on Agent Orange and will initiate no new
investigations of the problem. The VA's Special Agent Orange Project has been sub-
sumed into another bureaucratic entity studying environmentally related health ques-
tions. And the Special Master administering the Agent Orange court settlement has
stipulated that money placed at the disposal of the class cannot be employed for re-
search purposes.
It would be understandable ifveterans' advocates reached a similar conclusion, not be-
cause all there is to know about the health consequences of exposure to dioxin has been
uncovered (the reproductive consequences in particular require more analysis), but be-
cause "further research" most likely constitutes a political dead end. Additional results,
no matter how dramatic, are not likely to overcome institutional resistance, nor to per-
suade researchers whose skepticism does not serve veterans well. While new research
inches forward, the generation of veterans in question is year-by-year disappearing.
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However, the data on the record, some ofwhich is summarized above, is already power-
ful enough to create a strong presumption in favor of veteran claimants. We would
recommend that these veterans and their children be extended the benefit of the doubt
and that strong measures be made to meet their needs. A similar assumption guided
legislation introduced by Senator John Kerry, passed and signed by the President in
early 1991. This bill defines non-Hodgkins lymphoma, soft tissue sarcomas, and
chloracne as service-related health problems and stipulates that veterans suffering from
non-Hodgkins lymphoma and soft tissue sarcomas shall be eligible for disability pay-
ments and that veterans with chloracne shall be eligible for partial benefits.
Unfortunately, the legislation does not address the reproductive consequences of ex-
posure to Agent Orange, as manifested in birth defects and learning disorders among
the children of Vietnam veterans. Though some forms of neurological problems and
learning disabilities in children have been linked to parental exposure to dioxin, most
of the evidence provided thus far has been anecdotal in nature. Other aspects remain
in an even deeper obscurity. For example, Dr. Erwin R. Parson, a leading expert on
combat-related psychological difficulties faced by Vietnam veterans, has pointed out
that the emotional stress among veterans caused by anxiety over the possibility ofAgent
Orange exposure and its effects may serve to create a home environment which can
prove harmful to the children of these veterans.
The issue of Agent Orange remains a difficult and persistent problem for Vietnam
veterans and their families. In a very important way, it represents a health problem of
epidemic proportions: 28.1% of Vietnam veterans and 12.5% of their children report
medical problems they believe to be related to Agent Orange. The issue of compensa-
tion must still be resolved by the court and the federal government. At the state level,
Agent Orange must be seen as an enduring health legacy of the Vietnam War which
will continue to affect veterans and their children for years into the future. The state
must be encouraged to organize resources across the Commonwealth to address the
present and future impact. This should include at a minimum funding for a State Agent
Orange Program to offer outreach, education, and referral services to veterans and
their families as well as development of a strategy to address Agent Orange as a major
public health issue.
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
The Discovery of PTSD
Abetter understanding of "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder" among healers throughout
American society is among the most notable achievements of the Vietnam veterans
movement. Awareness of the psychological costs of combat dates back at least to the
Civil War, but the language employed to capture this phenomenon (e.g., "shell shock,"
"battle fatigue") marginalized and belittled the pain itwas intended to signify. Research
and advocacy, especially by veterans, forced an enlargement of this conception, and in
1979 the VA established its Operation Outreach program in 100 storefront locations
across the nation, including four in Massachusetts. In 1980 the Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual ofMental Disorders (DSMS), issued by the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, recognized PTSD for the first time. The VA responded by identifying PTSD as a
compensable service-connected condition and establishing treatment centers around
the country as well as a national research center.
The Commission Report
The Commission Report recommended the state establish its own system of Outreach
Centers based loosely on the model of federal Outreach Centers. Even before the
Commission issued its final report, state-funded centers in Roxbury and Fitchburgwere
established; nine other state centers were eventually opened, including 3 bilingual
centers in Boston, Worcester, and Springfield. Through the efforts of the Commission
and local veterans groups, a network of 11 Vietnam Veteran Outreach Centers was es-
tablished across the state.
Though coping with the long-term effects ofPTSD among the state's Vietnam veterans
was a major focus of these centers, it was generally understood that this would be un-
dertaken within the context of comprehensive attention to the variety ofproblems that
veterans seeking assistance would present. Rehabilitation techniques were based upon
the concept of peer counseling, on the assumption that veterans would be more
forthcoming when working with someone of similar experiences and background.
However, in order to ensure that veterans would gain maximum benefit from the peer
counseling approach, an independent study commissioned by the Office of the Com-
missioner of Veterans Services (OCVS) strongly recommended that the staff of these
centers receive on-going professional training.
As the Commission noted in its 1983 report, many veterans were critical ofVA Medi-
cal Centers and Regional Offices placing restrictions on services and activities of the
the federal Outreach Centers. Further, these Centers were seen to continually operate
without long-term commitments to refunding.
Additionally, many veterans criticized the specific procedures employed by the VA to
deal with PTSD. The VA program of psychological rehabilitation is based on the tradi-
tional clinical model, in which patients are assigned to mental health professionals for
treatment. The relationship between the veteran and the VA staffer is consequently
hierarchical: the mental health worker is empowered by the institution to categorize
the veteran and recommend treatment. Under these conditions, veterans stated that
they often felt at risk when discussing their difficulties with staff members of the VA.
These feelings were sometimes compounded by differences in the socio-economic
status of veterans and VA professionals. Some veterans noted that procedures may
also be insensitive to the traditional resistance ofVietnam combat veterans to the basic
concept of psychological trauma and the consequent stigmatizing effects. They don't
want to be labeled as "crazy."
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The National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study
The Congressionally-mandated National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study
reported in 1988 that 481,000 men (15% of all men in Vietnam) and 716women (10.0%
of all women in Vietnam) were determined to currently suffer from some degree of
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as a result of their experience in war. Overall, 40% of
Vietnam veterans have suffered from PTSD at some time in their lives. The study also
found Blacks and Hispanics to suffer higher incidence of PTSD: 23% among Blacks;
27% among Hispanics.
The National Center for PTSD
In 1990, the Veterans Administration designated four sites as centers for research ac-
tivity under the collective title ofThe National Center for PTSD. VA facilities in New
Haven, CT, Palo Alto, CA, White River Junction, VT, and Jamaica Plain, MA were the
sites selected. The designation of Jamaica Plain as a lead research facility, along with
the creation of the Massachusetts PTSD Network, has helped foster a better climate
within the state and the nation wherein PTSD can be examined and discussed with the
serious attention it deserves as a national and international health issue.
The Follow-Up Survey
In the survey ofMassachusetts Vietnam veterans, 23.5% of all Vietnamveteran respon-
dents claimed to have suffered from some degree of PTSD. This figure is higher than
that found in the National Readjustment Study. As would be expected for veterans with
service in Vietnam, PTSD increased dramatically depending on branch of service, com-
bat exposure, and the experience of being wounded. Additionally, while the degree of
combat exposure had only a modest effect on mild and moderate stress disorders, its
effect on severe and debilitating forms of PTSD was significant; 53.3% of those with
severe PTSD had direct combat experience, while 34.3% were from combat support
units. Likewise, for those wounded in Vietnam, the percent having suffered some de-
gree of PTSD jumped to 60.8%. Being
wounded also increased the severity ofPTSD
reported. Current PTSD by Combat Exposure
Perhaps the most telling information to
emerge from the survey relates to the con-
tinuing effects of PTSD on the lives of Viet-
nam veterans. 15 years after the end of the
war, 32.5% of the Vietnam veterans who had
been in direct combat, combat support, or
had been wounded stated that they still suf-
fer from PTSD. Moreover, these figures in-
crease by 10-20% for veterans of color. The
greater the exposure to combat, the greater
the incidence of PTSD, and the greater the
severity.
(26(3) 47.3% PTSD
(3382) 28.6% PTSD
(1480) 16.1% PTSD
/<>/{ /^l \ (200) 24.5% PTJSD
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Utilization of Outreach Centers and PTSD
Data from the Joiner Center's 1988 survey supports earlier testimony of veterans and
service providers by demonstrating that the use of the state's Vietnam Veterans Out-
reach Centers was not in fact based on veterans perceptions of problems with PTSD,
but was generally precipitated by other, more material concerns. For example, the
number of visits to the Outreach Centers was highly correlated to the occurrence and
extent of unemployment: 45.3% of the respondents who experienced a lengthy period
of unemployment utilized the centers, and the rates increase in a linear fashion the
more times respondents were unemployed. Additionally, just over 61% of those with
disabilities used Outreach Center services, and the greater the disability the more apt
the veteran was to visit the center.
Use of Vet Center increases with severity of PTSD
93.0% 94.1%
76.4%
23.6%
^
5.9%
23
This finding is complemented by the
compilation of figures by the OCVS
summary report on Vietnam veterans
initiatives for the fiscal year 1989 and
1990. In this two-year period, the 10
Outreach Centers collectively fielded
over 25,000 phone inquiries, had
direct contact with over 26,000
veterans, and exchanged over 21,000
pieces of correspondence.
debilitating
EZ1 Use Service GZ2 Do not use Service
However, the downturn in the Mas-
sachusetts economy has resulted in
the demise of this important veteran's
program. The Veterans Outreach Program budget was initially $1,023,619 for fiscal
year 1989/90, but was cut to $948,619 before the year was over. In fiscal year 1990/91,
while the outreach program was allocated $800,000, all funding for state Outreach
Centers was eliminated in November 1990. At present, many centers are attempting
to stay open, on a part-time basis at least, by employing a range of fund-raising techni-
ques, including raffles and direct solicitation for operating funds from both the public
and private industry. The Commonwealth has restored some funding for the centers.
Conclusion
As is the case with Agent Orange, PTSD remains a major public health issue; and with
23.5% of all Vietnam veterans claiming to suffer to some degree from PTSD, it too may
be described as epidemic in proportions. All evidence suggests that PTSD is a lifelong
issue affecting both the veteran and his or her family. Again, a mustering of resources
at the state level must be brought to bear to develop a strategy for the future. At the
very least, those institutions which are most sought out and most able to serve these
veterans should be adequately funded: the Brad Burns unit at the Rutland Heights State
Hospital be should be reopened and the state's Outreach Centers should be fully
funded.
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Employment
The Commission Report
The 1983 Commission Study found Vietnam and Vietnam-Era veterans reporting an
unemployment rate of 11.8%. This rate was more than 4 percentage points above the
national average (7.1% for males 35-55). Among Massachusetts veterans who were
employed, almost a quarter of those reporting (24.6%) worked in the public sector
(9.0% federal; 4.9% state; 10.7% local). This relatively high participation rate in the
public sector may be seen as reflective of the commitment to public service which
veterans carry forward into civilian life, as well as efforts the public sector makes to
recruit veterans. The original commission report, however, was critical of enforcement
and public knowledge of the Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Act and other recruit-
ment and affirmative action measures for Vietnam-Era veterans, advocating more ag-
gressive measures be undertaken at state and federal levels.
The Follow-Up Survey
The Follow-Up Survey, conducted during the peak of the economic boom in Mas-
sachusetts, showed both encouraging and discouraging trends. Overall, unemployment
was down compared to 1983, but Vietnam and Vietnam-Era veterans still reported un-
employment at rates 2 percentage points higher than their peers at the time of report-
ing (9.2% vs. 7.2%). In spite of efforts through such programs as FJTPA Title 4C, still
veterans employment continues to lag, suggesting more support may be needed. The
Outreach Centers until recently have provided a major source of support in assisting
Vietnam veterans in finding employment. Recent proposals to defund federal govern-
ment support for the Disabled Veteran Outreach Program (DVOP) to assist veterans
finding employment through state employment offices make the services of the Out-
reach Centers all the more significant. However, as has been pointed out, these centers
are being severely cut or closed.
An encouraging sign is that more Vietnam and Vietnam-Era veterans reported work-
ing in the public sector in the most recent survey. Overall the figures show an increase
of almost 30%, up from 9.2% in 1983 to 12.5% in 1988 for the federal government,
from 5% to 6.8% for the state, and from 10.7% to 13.7% for local levels of govern-
ment.
As may be seen there were gains for veterans in all public service areas of employment.
The executive order granting Vietnam-Era veterans affirmative action status in mid-
1983 may have been instrumental in providing entry into the state system for many of
these new employees. 38% of those veterans answering the questionnaire were aware
of this executive order. 70% of those working in state government said they were aware
of the measure and over 30% of those (30.4%) said they were helped by affirmative ac-
tion.
These figures may be encouraging, but when only 70% of those employed by the state
are aware of measures the Commonwealth has passed to protect them, and only 30%
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of those employed by the state said they were directly helped by such measures,
problems clearly remain in the circulation of this vital information and the perception
of the effectiveness of the state's affirmative action programs as they relate to Vietnam
veterans. There may be further cause for alarm: if this increase in hiring ofveterans in
public sector positions between 1983-1988 is accurate, then this group may be among
the most vulnerable to the layoffs currently underway at federal, state, and local levels.
Work and Economic Mobility
In the survey, 38.8% of Vietnam veterans reported working in professional/technical
positions; 43.7% ofVietnam-Era veterans reported being employed in these same posi-
tions. 17.7% of Vietnam veterans and 19.5% of Vietnam-Era veterans reported being
in management positions.
As is evident the survey shows a greater participation in blue collar and trades employ-
ment among Vietnam veterans. Combining the figures from above, a total of56.5% of
the Vietnam veterans and 63.2% of the Vietnam-Era veterans were in profes-
sional/technical or managerial positions. Vietnam veterans had greater representation
proportionally than Vietnam-Era veterans in the blue collar professions.
Vietnamveterans report earning on an average 6% less than their Vietnam-Eraveteran
peers.
Promotion andjob satisfaction as well as employment remained an issue for the respon-
dents. Roughly one third (33.2%) of the respondents reported that their job status had
not improved in the last five years. 37.0% of the Vietnam and 34.4% of the Vietnam-
Era veterans indicated that their employment status had not improved in five years.
Those in the managerial and professional/technical fields showed the most improve-
ment, followed by those in the construction industry. But almost a quarter of the
respondents (24.2%) reported not having received a promotion in the past five years.
Conclusion
Despite affirmative action programs and federal and state employment assistance
programs, Vietnam and Vietnam-Era veterans still remain unemployed in greater
rates than their non-veteran peers. Vietnam veterans as a group earn less than their
Vietnam-Era veteran peers, are more apt to be employed in trades, are less likely to
receive promotions, and experience longer periods of unemployment when un-
employed.
Much has been made of a nation's gratitude to its veterans, but in this most tangible
area, some degree of discrimination appears to be at work. More stringent enforce-
ment of affirmative action guidelines must be put in place; special outreach efforts by
employers in the private and public sectors must also be undertaken; and increased
funding of jobs and job training programs under the FJTPA must be provided. The
close relationship between unemployment and PTSD has been amply documented. At
a time when many Vietnam veterans, particularly those in public service, may be losing
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their jobs, the Outreach Centers created to assist them through such transitions are
threatened with closure, creating a clear formula for disaster.
Small Business
The Commission Report
The Commission survey in 1983 revealed that 5.6% of the respondents indicated an in-
terest in small business. In public hearings and a special hearing on employment, the
Commission found that the vast majority of Vietnam veteran-owned small businesses
were too small to be assisted by either the Small Business Administration (SBA) or
state programs under the Department ofCommerce and various other agencies. These
agencies tended to focus on healthy, relatively mature small businesses. Though the
definition of small business includes all businesses employing from 1 to under 500
people, the actual floor for financial assistance is for businesses employing no less than
50 people.
In 1985-1986, the Joiner Center managed a Veterans Small Business Program for the
Office of the Commissioner of Veterans Services. That effort included a survey of
veteran-owned small businesses in the Commonwealth. The data corroborated what
the Commission had noted three years earlier, i.e. that Vietnam veteran small busi-
nesses were micro small businesses - start-ups and part-time ventures employing under
12 people. Most knew their particular business, but needed assistance with business
management. The OCVS/Joiner Center Program provided small business manage-
ment classes and workshop assistance for over 200 small businessmen who served in
Vietnam or during the Vietnam-Era.
The Follow-Up Survey
Vietnam and Vietnam-Era veteran participation in small business increased dramati-
cally between 1982-1988. The Follow-Up Survey shows 2,657 (14.9%) of the Vietnam
and Vietnam-Era veterans who responded indicated that they were currently involved
in operating either a full or part-time small business. The percent of total family in-
come generated from the small business ventures was reported as follows: 23.1%
earned 25% or less from the small business; 13.9% earned between 26 and 50%; 10.4%
earned between 51 and 75%; 52.6% earned between 76 and 100%. Slightly over 76%
of small business owners reported employing under five people and 10% employed be-
tween 5 and 10 people.
Vietnam and Vietnam-Era veterans in small business reported generating
$74,340,511.64 in taxable income for the Commonwealth for 1988. Utilizing a mean
income and projecting that to the other 640 businesses (respondents who did not answer
income questions), Vietnam veteran-owned small businesses are estimated to have
generated a total of $97,928,973.23 in taxable income for the Commonwealth.
Institutional assistance may have increased the participation of these veterans in small
business. Over 9.2% (1,582) of the total Vietnam and Vietnam-Era respondents
reported seeking assistance in one form or another from the SBA. Of the 1582, just
15
Formally Applied to SBAfor Assistance
Era /Refused (29
Era / Received (1
Viet Vet / Received (12.5%)
over half (796 - 51.7%) served in Viet-
nam. However, only 686 (43.4%)
reported receiving the counselling as-
sistance they sought; 46.4% of these
were Vietnam veterans, 53.6% served
during the era. Eventually 2.4% of the
respondents formally applied for finan-
cial assistance at one time or another to
the SBA. 52.2% were Vietnam
wet vet /Refused (40.1%) veterans and 49.8% were Era veterans.
Just under a third of all those, 119
veterans (30.6%) received the loan. Of
these, 47 (41.2%) were Vietnam
veterans while 58.8% served in the era.
In sum of the 204 Vietnam combat
veterans who applied for assistance only 47 (23.7%) of those who applied received the
loan. Era veterans fared better; of the 187 who applied, 67 or 37.4% received the loan.
Conclusion
Again, the profile posed by the Follow-Up Survey was obtained at a period of relative
economic prosperity in the Commonwealth. The relative increase in entrepreneurial
activities by Vietnam veterans during this period may now be severely jeopardized by
the current recession. These new businesses, small and marginal in many cases, are the
types of businesses most at risk in the current economy. Some obvious measures,
however, should be taken to protect these gains.
• To encourage veteran owned small businesses, a 10% state and local contract
percentage should be set aside for Vietnam veteran small businesses.
• The state should develop and implement an entrepreneurial development
program which will make a special outreach effort to Vietnam and Vietnam-
Era veterans.
Housing
The Commission Report
During its lifetime the Commission was able to establish a priority for Vietnam veterans
with regard to the 1983 MFHA housing bond package lottery and fuel assistance
program. In addition, as a result of the public hearings in general, the special hearing
on housing, survey data, and a number of interviews the Commission report of 1983
made six recommendations with regard to housing policy for veterans in Massachusetts.
Unfortunately these recommendations were not implemented by the administration.
Homelessness
The problem of homelessness has been a burden that has disproportionately affected
our nation's veterans. Veterans from the Civil War, World War I, World War II, Korea,
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and Vietnam have all shared in this unfortunate experience. In the past several years
however, certain trends among the homeless population have come to light which are
alarming. In a hearing held by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Veterans Affairs on October 23, 1989, Congressman Joseph P. Kennedy III reported
that, of an estimated homeless population of 2.5 million people in the United States,
about one-third of that number (or just over 800,000 men, women, and children) are
veterans and their dependents. Officials from the U.S. Department of Veterans Af-
fairs provided further statistics indicating that the average homeless veteran is 43 years
old, which suggests that the majority of homeless veterans are men and women who
served in America's Armed Forces during the Vietnam War era. This information is
corroborated in a study done by Brian Matchett of homeless veterans in Massachusetts
released in 1988, which found that 59% of the state's homeless veterans had served
during that conflict.
The committee also heard testimony that has particular relevance to the problem of
homeless veterans in the Boston area. Smith Jenkins, Jr., Director of the Department
of Veterans Affairs (DVA) Boston Medical Center, outlined the services being
provided to some of Boston's homeless veterans under the DVA's Homeless Chroni-
cally Mentally 111 Program, stating that more than half of the homeless veterans seen
by DVA workers in this program are Vietnam-Era veterans. Based on information
gathered at the Center, Jenkins estimated that currently more than one thousand home-
less veterans are located in Boston alone; other sources put the number of homeless
veterans in the area even higher. The New England Shelter for Homeless Veterans es-
timates that there are 1,500 to 2,000 homeless veterans in the Boston-area.
The opening of The New England Shelter for Homeless Veterans in 1989 marked an
important step forward in providing services for homeless veterans. Located at the
former VA Court St. facility, the Shelter provides 150 beds and has 70 Single Room
Occupancy units under construction.
The Veterans Benefits Clearinghouse has also undertaken major projects to provide
services including 30 units of permanent and transitional housing for homeless
veterans.
The problems of affordable housing and shelter remain critical issues as more and more
veterans are forced onto the margins.
The Follow-Up Survey
In the Follow-Up Survey, 76.6% of the Vietnam veterans and 80.2% of the Vietnam-
Era veterans reported owning their own home. The large number of homeowners
among respondents may be attributed to the use of Registry of Motor Vehicle lists to
identify veterans who collected bonuses twenty years ago. Among Vietnam veterans
other housing options showed 19.1% rented, 3.8% resided with their parents, and .5%
were homeless. Among Vietnam veterans these figures for home ownership were
lower for minorities in general (66.9%), Hispanics (60.0%) and Blacks (55.9%) in par-
ticular.
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KNOWLEDGE / PARTICIPATION IN THREE STATE PROGRAMS One of the keys to finding ade
Knowledge of Chapter 707; Chapter 705; MFHA (as an average)
Received (0.5%)
Heard of-never applied (13.0%)
Refused (0.3%)
Never heard of (86.2%)
quate housing is knowledge of
available programs. Knowledge
of state and federal assistance
programs was equally low among
both Vietnam and Vietnam-Era
veterans. Only 56.9% were aware
of the GI Home Loan program;
20.5% of the Veterans responding
had made use of it.
Additionally, only 12.5% and 11%
of the respondents had heard of
the state's chapter 707 and 705
programs and less than a quarter
of one percent ever applied for
relief through those programs.
The state's MFHA program was more well known; 4,688 veterans (28.6%) had heard
of it; another 176 veterans (1.1%) had applied and received assistance.
Knowledge/awareness of federal housing programs was more widespread among the
respondents. 5,099 (31.4%) had heard of the Section 8 program; 148 (1.0%) applied;
90 or .6% received the assistance. Under 25% had heard of either the 234 or 236 FHA
programs; one percent or less applied and .7% or less receive the assistance. 5,668
(35%) had heard of the Farmers Home Loan; 1.1% applied for assistance and .9%
received it.
Conclusion
One striking characteristic of these veteran homeowners is the relatively few who have
benefited from federal or state programs designed to benefit veterans. Public percep-
tion often visualizes a rich panoply of benefits that await veterans after leaving service.
The GI Home Loan Guarantee Program is often held out as the epitome of this benefit
package. Yet, the overwhelming majority of respondents were unaware of this program
and chose other routes to home ownership. This would suggest a need for updating and
restructuring of relevant programs as well as an increased effort to outreach eligible
veterans for subsidized housing. Finally, there is a clear need for increased support for
programs to prevent and address the issues of homelessness.
Military Service
The Follow-Up Survey
Of those responding to the survey, 48.3% were Vietnam Veterans and 51.7 were Viet-
nam-Era veterans; 19.2% were draftees and 80.8% were volunteers. Draftees were
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more likely to have served in Vietnam: 54.7% of draftees served in Vietnam as opposed
to 46.8% of those who volunteered.
AS WOUld be expected the Participation by Branch of Service
greatest representation of for-
ces in Vietnam were among
Marine and Army veterans. Of
Marines surveyed 71.4% had
served in Vietnam; 54.7% of
Army respondents had served
in Vietnam; 42.1% of Navy;
32.9% of Air Force; 31.3% of
National Guard; and 27% of
Coast Guard.
Of those who served in Viet-
nam 33.3% described their
duty as combat; 44.4% as com-
bat support; 19.7% as service (^ Vietnam Vets
support; and 2.6% as medic/nurse/or doctor.
Of those who served in Vietnam 1 1.3% had been awarded the Purple Heart. Of those
who served in Vietnam 22.4% reported receiving disabilities from the Veterans Ad-
ministration. The majority of these disabilities (58.5%) were under 30%.
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Minority Veterans
The Commission Report
The Commission noted the level of black participation in combat arms (according to
the research of one military scholar, the percentage of Blacks in combat was 28.6% in
1967), and the negative consequences of project 100,000 (40% of whom were Blacks
brought into the military and given none of the training promised and were not allowed
to reenlist). It also noted that for many Black veterans any positive benefits which might
accrue as a result of their veteran status were generally not forthcoming. The Commis-
sion held a hearing at the Harriet Tubman House of Boston on May 1 1, 1982. Minority
veterans testified about the lack of services to the minority community and charac-
terized the state and city delivery systems as both insensitive and unresponsive.
The Commission recommended monies for the establishment of the Veterans Benefits
Clearinghouse of Roxbury and recommended full funding for the following year. Fur-
ther, the Commission stressed that special outreach efforts be made to the minority
veterans community with regard to funding initiatives (block grant monies, etc.). In ad-
dition, there was a recommendation that Upward Bound-style programs be established
at Roxbury Community College, UMass, and Springfield Technical Institute, and that
culturally orientated brochures be developed which clearly outline the services avail-
able for Hispanic veterans and that various agencies increase their bilingual staff. The
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MINORITY PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM
Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native American, Other
Medic/Nurse/MD (3.2%)
Commission also acknowledged some of the difficulties faced by women veterans and
recommended through the Congressional delegation that the Veterans Administration
includewomen in theirPTSD studies, and initiate changes to accommodate the increas-
ing number ofwomen with veteran status.
In light ofthe recommendations above, funding was generated for the minority veterans
center in Roxbury; some years later one was established for the Hispanic community.
As noted above, however, state funding for all the community-based veterans Outreach
Centers was cut on November 15, 1990. The VA has included women in PTSD studies,
particularly under the leadership of Dr. Jessica Wolfe at the Jamaica Plain VA.
The Follow-up Survey
The Follow-Up Survey had a very small sample of minorities. Only 6.7% of the respon-
dents to the survey were from minority communities. Only 178 (1%) of the respon-
dents were black. Of those, 93 (52%) served in Vietnam.
In line with the experience of black veterans nationally, blacks reported higher par-
ticipation in direct combat positions. Altogether, 43.5% of the black veterans in the
survey who served in Vietnam were in combat units and an additional 39.1% were in
combat support units. The cor-
responding rates for all respon-
dents were 32.8% for Combat and
44.4% for combat support. 48.0%
of the minority veterans who
served in Vietnam claimed to
have experienced PTSD at some
time; the figure was 38.7% for all
veterans. Increased levels of
PTSD among Blacks reported in
the survey corresponds with na-
tional findings and has been
linked to increased exposure to
combat and lack of access to in-
stitutional support upon their
return to the U.S.
Combat Support (A5.7%]^~^~LLLU-^-^
Further, 37.8% of the minority
veterans who served in Vietnam
claimed to currently have PTSD problems. This is at a rate greater than that reported
nationally.
Conclusion
There remains a clear need to give priority to addressing the needs of minority veterans.
Throughout the history of this country, Blacks, Hispanics, and Asian-Americans have
demonstrated their courage and willingness to make sacrifices in times of war. Unfor-
tunatley, these sacrifices have not brought corresponding gains, and in the case of Viet-
Service Support (18.1%)
Combat (33.0%)
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nam, where evidence seems to point to a lack of gains made by veterans, these veterans
in particular have been hard hit. At a minimum the following should be implemented.
• A special needs assessment within the minority veterans community should
be conducted and appropriate recommendations made.
• Funding should be reestablished for the two minority veterans Outreach
Centers.
Education
The Commission Report
In its final report the Special Commission noted that the use by Vietnam veterans of
educational benefits provided by the GI Bill was a controversial issue. On one hand,
the Veterans Administration claimed that Vietnam veterans were the most highly edu-
cated of any previous era of veterans. On the other hand, advocates claimed that al-
though many Vietnam veterans had used the GI Bill, far fewer had successfully com-
pleted college and obtained a degree. In fact, those with lower educational attainment
levels prior to military service, those veterans most likely to benefit from educational
benefits, were the veterans least likely to use their benefits. The focus of the Commis-
sion was to get a picture of the educational status of Vietnam veterans and examine
their needs for the future.
Educational Levels Among Veterans
Percentages of total for each group
The Commission noted that one of the principal problems confronting the veterans was
that educational needs were changing with the economy. Not only were higher levels
of traditional education needed, but these had to be complemented with multiple skills
in order for the veteran to become competitive with his peers.
The Commission noted and recommended support for the several legislative efforts in-
troduced to assist veterans in the Commonwealth. In addition it noted and recom-
mended support for the UMass/Boston's Veterans Upward Bound Program and Wil-
liam Joiner Center; extension of
the delimiting date at state institu-
tions; and support through the
Congressional delegation for
several pieces of legislation per-
taining to the extension of the
delimiting date.
The Follow-up Survey
As of 1988 respondents had com-
pleted the following highest levels
of schooling: Grade School , 4.0%,
Some High School, 5.0%, High
School, 31.5%, 2 Yrs College,
27.7%, College Grad, 16.3%, Grad
School, 15.5%.
16.7% 16.5%
< = HS 2Yrs College
p^
—
|
Vietnam Veterans
College Grad School
\// 2 Era Veterans
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17.7%
Utilization of the Gl Bill
Approximately two-thirds of the veterans reported using the GI Bill for schooling. The
use of the GI Bill was relatively equal among Vietnam and Vietnam-Era veterans,
67.1% and 65.1% respectively. While 68.6% of respondents reported degree objec-
tives, less than 10% (9.6%) received four years of support under the GI Bill. In fact,
more than one fifth (21%) of the respondents reported using the GI Bill for less than
one year. Almost one-half (46.6%) received less than two years of benefits.
VIETNAM VETERANS UTILIZING THE GI BILL FOR A DEGREE PROGRAM Js^ nas often been pointed OUt
Bnn Only 18% of the veterans finished or went beyond the Bachelors degree program. histOTicallV Vietnam and Viet-
nam-Era veterans have made
good use of the GI educational
benefit. High participation rates,
however, are undermined by low
completion rates as the figures
above indicate. Since for almost
all Vietnam and Vietnam-Era
veterans, GI Bill Educational
benefits expired in 1989, those
veterans seeking to continue their
educations are left to depend lar-
gely on state programs.
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The heightened fiscal crisis has affected veterans along with other students. For ex-
ample, for students at state colleges and universities such as UMass/Boston in fall 1990,
tuition per semester went up from $756 to $967, and in spring 1991 curriculum support
fees jumped from $200 to $600. With the addition of fees for athletics, health, ac-
tivities, and ID cards, plus now-mandatory medical insurance, the total cost of a full-
time semester at UMass/Boston is close to $2,000, a figure that has doubled since spring
1988.
These changes have created a growing financial and bureaucratic nightmare for stu-
dents, veterans and others. For example, prior to 1982, GI Bill benefits did not have
to be declared on financial aid forms, but cutbacks and attacks on entitlement programs
have gradually eroded this benefit. First, it was the Vietnam-Era tuition waiver which,
in response to a Massachusetts Board of Regents directive, is now counted as an "out-
side scholarship" and has been subtracted from financial aid payments for several years
now. When the tuition waiver for Vietnam veterans was passed by the legislature it had
been intended as an incentive for veterans to continue their education. It was not in-
tended as a scholarship subject to a means test which it has become.
In fall 1990, colleges for the first time counted veterans' vocational rehabilitation
benefits, educational benefits paid to disabled veterans, as outside scholarship assis-
tance and deducted this sum from estimated expenses in calculating need. Consequent-
ly, for veterans with service-connected disabilities, including those incurred in Viet-
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nam, support for college education has been cut. Even the IRS does not regard dis-
ability payments as taxable income.
Colleges also count National Guard tuition waivers as outside scholarships. Both
Guards and Reserves train one weekend a month and two weeks in summer, and both
receive training pay andVA benefits, but since 1978 the Guard has enjoyed the recruit-
ing advantage of providing a tuition waiver. Many students who joined to help finance
their college educations are finding that this benefit has been nullified by cuts in univer-
sity financial aid support.
Conclusion
The decisions made by veterans to enroll in college are often not clear cut yes/no
propositions, as they would be for "traditional" undergraduates. When economically
pressed in times such as these, full-time veteran students with jobs often switch to part-
time student status and increase their work hours, or they drop out to work full-time
and save money before reapplying. These flexible devices prolong the time necessary
for a college education, but they have enabled many veteran students to cope with
economic difficulties and to continue their educations.
Such tactics are now less effective than in the past. Part-time student status today is
more expensive than full-time status was in 1989-90, and the recession has eliminated
many part- and full-time work opportunities.
Veterans seeking to pursue their educational goals are currently in trouble. If the tui-
tion waiver program for veterans is both an incentive and a reward for service and for
pursuing a higher education upon completion of service, it must not be subjected to a
means test or counted as income for scholarship purposes, nor should disability pay-
ments.
Public Participation
The Commission Report
The issue of public participation was not directly addressed by the commission in 1983.
The Follow-up Survey
At the suggestion of members of the veteran community, questions relating to Viet-
nam and Vietnam-Era veteran opinion on particular issues affecting both the com-
munity at large and the veteran community were included in the questionnaire. There
are a few notable exceptions in listing of priorities between Vietnam and Vietnam -Era
veterans on these issues.
For Vietnam veterans the greatest priority issue remains the POW/MIA issue. This
issue ranks third, after employment and education for Vietnam-Era veterans. The other
two significant discrepancies relate to Agent Orange and PTSD, which Vietnam-Era
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veterans rank lower as priorities than Vietnam veterans. Clearly, exposure to combat
and Agent Orange in Vietnam plays a significant role in explaining these differences.
Greatest Priority Vietnam Vietnam-Era
POW/MIA 83.7 75.9%
Employment 80.6 82.3%
Education 77.5% 81.1%
VA Health Care 73.5% 70.2%
Agent Orange 71.3% 52.6%
>TSD 63.1% 49.9%
Housing
3ublic Image
62.5% 63.4%
61.0% 49.1%
Small Business 48.0% 42.4%
Judicial Review 33.1% 50.4%
3ad Discharge 15.0% 15.1%
Regarding participation in local organizations, the findings were equally interesting.
Over 86% of Vietnam veterans are registered voters, 53% as independents, 34%
Democrats, and 12% Republicans.
Vietnam and Vietnam-Era respondents represent an active, if diverse social group who
participate in the political process. Perhaps more surprising were responses relating to
government spending on particular issues ranked according to: "the government spent
far too little" to "far too much" on them. Responses are ranked according to responses
stating the government spends too little on these programs.
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Support for Government
Spending Vietnam Vietnam-Era
Children 94% 94%
Crime 90% 90%
Education 89% 89%
Health 89% 89%
Hunger 89% 88%
Homelessness 86% 85%
Environment 85% 85%
Aids Research 84% 85%
Alcohol and Drug Rehab 79% 80%
Space 46% 48%
Defense 43% 41%
Final Comments and Recommendations
If anything, the evidence of this report shows that those who bore the greatest burdens
during the Vietnam War continue to bear the greatest burdens after. Vietnam veterans
continue to suffer greater health problems, to have lower educational attainment, and
to earn less than their Vietnam-Era veteran peers. In addition, the data suggests that
the greater the veteran's exposure to combat, the greater the likelihood of such
problems, and the greater their potential severity. For the first time, this report shows
these problems do not simply go away; they are carried forward into future generations.
Vietnam Veterans have always been resourceful and this study portrays a diverse and
socially active constituency well-rooted in the community. Vietnam veterans respond-
ing to the survey remain true to their own histories, and issues such as the POW/MIA
issue and Agent Orange, which do not affect the majority ofAmericans directly, remain
the most important issues for Vietnam veterans. However, Vietnam veterans join their
Vietnam-Era veteran peers in expressing overwhelming support for education, health,
and social welfare issues.
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Unfortunately, the issues of health, education, and social welfare relating particularly
to Vietnam veterans remain unaddressed within our society. Small programmatic gains
were made in the 1980's. The dedication of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in
Washington, D.C., as well as dedication of memorials in cities and town around the
country brought greater public awareness. The Commonwealth's Special Commission
on the Concerns of Vietnam Veterans, like similar commissions in other states, made
great strides to move from awareness of issues to understanding and redress. But in
recent years, even these gains have been eroded and in some cases eliminated.
As the information presented in this study shows, Vietnam veterans are a population
at risk. Agent Orange and PTSD present problems of almost epidemic proportions
whose effects can spill over into all areas of life. In order to assist in beginning a com-
prehensive attempt to address these issues the following is recommended:
The Commonwealth convene a task force bringing together leaders in public health,
mental health, housing, employment, education, veterans services and disability care
from both public and private sectors to formulate strategies to address these issues.
In the meantime, until such a strategy is devised, at a minimum we recommend:
• The state Outreach Center system be maintained and fully funded.
• The state Agent Orange Program be refunded to provide a needs assessment
and program recommendations regarding families of veterans who may be
affected or have a child affected by Agent Orange.
• Strict monitoring and enforcement of state affirmative actions guidelines per-
taining to Vietnam-Era veterans be initiated.
• Vietnam-Era veterans be targeted for state transitional and permanent hous-
ing programs.
• A special needs assessment be done in minority communities, with ap-
propriate recommendations made.
As part of this process, the Joiner Center will convene a series of roundtable discus-
sions of policy issues to follow-up on the findings of this report.
Finally, we would like to thank all those who have assisted in this project. Most of all,
the more than 17,000 Vietnam and Vietnam-Era veterans who responded to the sur-
vey with their comments.
Paul R. Camacho, Ph.D., Associate Director
Kevin J. Bowen, Ph.D., Co-Director
David Hunt, Ph.D., Co-Director
26
